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Abstract 
Many important determinants of traffic fatalities have been identified using the widely popular fixed-effects (FE) 
estimator for panel data. However, the FE estimator precludes an analysis of time-invariant or rarely changing 
variables, thereby obscuring their relative impact on traffic fatalities. This study estimates the effect of time-invariant 
and rarely changing variables (climate, geography, laws, etc.) on the U.S. state traffic fatality rate using alternative 
econometric methods in addition to the FE estimator. We find that alcohol consumption, air temperature, and 
precipitation have the largest effect on traffic fatalities. Our findings suggest that policy makers and the insurance 
industry practitioners may want to re-evaluate the role of climate in road safety.
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     1. Introduction 
 
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2007), traffic fatalities are the 
leading cause of death in the United States among people between the ages of 1 and 34 years old. 
In the United States, traffic fatalities have increased on average by 4.7% from 1994 to 2006. 
During  this  period,  states  like  North  Dakota  and  Wyoming  have  experienced  double  digit 
increases in their traffic fatality rates, while states like Utah and Minnesota have seen a decrease 
in their traffic fatality rate by over 30%.    
 
Numerous policies have been adopted with the specific intention of reducing the traffic fatality 
rate. These policies include drinking and driving regulations, seat belt laws, and speed limits, 
among others. The increased availability of longitudinal panel data for the U.S. states together 
with the fixed-effects (FE) estimator have improved the analysis of the effectiveness of these 
policies in reducing traffic fatalities. However, the FE estimator absorbs the time-invariant or 
rarely changing variables, preventing us from estimating the relative contribution of these factors 
to traffic fatalities. In the context of road safety, the relevant time-invariant or rarely changing 
variables may include geography, climate, traffic laws and regulations, alcohol policies, culture, 
and habits. The effect of these factors on traffic fatalities may not be trivial, but they are often 
excluded from the FE estimator. This obscurity warrants an analysis of these factors. 
 
This study estimates the impact of several time-invariant and rarely changing variables on the 
traffic fatality rate using a balanced longitudinal panel of 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1982 to 
2006. We discern the impact of several rarely changing variables on traffic fatalities from state 
fixed  effects  using  random  effects  (RE)  and  fixed-effects  vector  decomposition  (FEVD) 
econometric  techniques.  The  strongest  determinants  of  traffic  fatalities  in  our  model,  as 
measured  by  estimated  elasticity  coefficients,  are  alcohol  consumption,  air  temperature,  and 
precipitation. Population density and crime rate also have a rather strong effect on the traffic 
fatality rate. Overall, our estimates suggest that climate is one of the strongest determinants of 
traffic fatalities in the United States. Even though climate is outside of policy makers’ control, 
our estimates suggest that climate considerations may need to play a more important role in the 
design of transportation infrastructure and auto insurance policies.  
 
2. The Empirical Model and Data 
 
According to the model specification search by Park et al. (2008), the log-linear model of traffic 
fatalities is statistically reliable. Furthermore, the log-linear model used in this study passes the 
Ramsey  (1969)  model  specification  test,  indicating  that  the  model  does  not  suffer  from 
significant omitted variable bias. The log-linear model specification also allows for nonlinear 
relationships to be estimated via OLS. Moreover, the regression coefficients in the log-linear 
model  can  be  interpreted  as  constant  elasticity  estimates,  simplifying  the  comparison  of 
coefficients.  For  these  reasons, we  propose estimating  the  following  log-linear  model  of the 
traffic fatality rate, where all strictly positive (non-zero) variables are transformed via natural 
logarithms:  
 
it it i i it y X Z u α β γ ε = + + + + .                                                                                                  (1) 
   1
Where yit is the traffic fatality rate, Xit is a vector of time-variant regressors, Zi is a vector of 
time-invariant or rarely changing regressors, ui  is the unobserved time-invariant (i.e. fixed) state 
effect, εit is the disturbance, and the subscripts i=1,…,48 and t = 1982,…, 2006 represent states 
and years, respectively. The parameters β, γ, ui , and εit are unobserved (i.e. to be estimated). The 
chosen regressors in our model are dictated by previous studies and economic intuition.
1 The 
choice  of  the  time  span  and  48  contiguous  states  is  dictated  by  data  availability.  Variable 
definitions,  sources,  and  summary  statistics  are  available  in  Table  1.  The  variance  inflation 
analysis of the model in equation 1 and the pair-wise correlations in Table 2 reveal that the 
chosen regressors are not multicollinear (results available upon request).  
 
The  time-variant  regressors  are  alcohol  consumption,  per  capita  income,  gasoline  price, 
population  density,  percentage  of  young  and  old  population,  and  the  crime  rate.  The  time-
invariant  and  rarely  changing  regressors  are  mountainous  and  coastal  state  dummies,  speed 
limits, precipitation, air temperature, primary seatbelt law dummy, compulsory insurance law 
dummy, and no-fault liability law dummy. Some of these variables are completely time-invariant 
(coastal and mountainous terrain), while others exhibit questionable degree of variation over 
time. For example, few states revised their speed limit levels more than once between 1982 and 
2006. States that adopted primary seat belt, compulsory insurance and no-fault liability laws had 
not changed them, while states that did not adopt these laws retained zero for the entire time span 
of the dataset, making these variables rarely changing. Although temperature and precipitation 
do  vary  from  year  to  year,  these  variations  are  rather  small,  compared  to  cross-sectional 
variations, and are highly collinear with the state fixed effects. Because some ambiguity exists as 
to the degree of time-invariance and, therefore, multicollinearity of these variables with the state 
fixed effects, it is prudent to examine the effect of these variables on traffic fatalities using 
different estimators.  
 
The  unit  or  within  FE  estimator  is  a  popular  panel  data  regression  technique  because  it  is 
designed to control for unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. the correlation of regressors with relevant 
omitted  variables).  According  to  the  Hausman  test  (results  available  upon  request),  the  FE 
estimator is more consistent than the RE estimator for our dataset. However, the FE estimator 
absorbs the time-invariant variables, precluding us from learning about their effects on traffic 
fatalities. Even rarely-changing variables in the FE estimator may have imprecise coefficient 
estimates  with  large  standard  errors  because  of  high  correlation  with  the  unit  fixed  effects 
(Breusch et al., 2010). Previous attempts to analyze the time-invariant variables in longitudinal 
panel data have relied on the RE, pooled OLS, and Hausman-Taylor estimators, which have their 
own  disadvantages  compared  to  the  ubiquitous  FE  estimator.  Recently,  Plümper  and  Troger 
(2007) developed the fixed-effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator, which they claim is 
more efficient and reliable than the pooled OLS, RE, and Hausman-Taylor estimators when both 
time-invariant  and  time-varying  variables  are correlated  with  the  fixed effects.  Nevertheless, 
Plümper and Troger (2007) acknowledge that the inclusion of time-invariant variables in the RE 
estimator  may  serve  as  the  second  best  alternative  to  the  FEVD  procedure.  For  the 
aforementioned reasons, we estimate the effect of time-invariant and rarely changing variables 
using three different regressions techniques: FE, RE, and FEVD. 
 
                                                 
1 The following studies, among other, were reviewed: Beck et al. (2007), Nelson et al. (1998), Peltzman (1975), 
Glassbrenner (2005), Garbacz (1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992), Risa (1994), Calkins and Zlatoper (2001), Sen (2001), 
Cummins et al. (2001), Cohen and Dehejia (2004).   2
A brief description of the newly developed FEVD estimator is warranted here. In essence, FEVD 
is a three stage procedure. The first stage implements the conventional fixed-effects model to 
obtain an estimate of the unit fixed effects. The second stage decomposes the fixed-effects vector 
into a part explained by the time-invariant variables and an unexplainable part (the residual). The 
third stage re-estimates the original model by pooled OLS, including the time-invariant variables 
and the residual from the second stage. 
 
In  this  paper,  however,  we  utilize  only  the  second  stage  of  the  FEVD  estimator  given  the 
criticisms made by Greene (2010) and Breusch et al. (2010) regarding the variance-covariance 
matrix implemented in the third-stage by Plümper and Troger (2007). The second stage of the 
FEVD  estimator  is  sufficient  to  analyze  the  effects  of  time-invariant  and  rarely  changing 
variables on traffic fatalities since the coefficients for time-invariant variables are identical in the 
second and third stages, making the third stage of FEVD redundant. The first stage of the FEVD 
procedure  estimates  the  standard  within  fixed  effects  model including  only  the  time-variant, 
right-hand-side variables: 
 
it it i it y X u e α β = + + + .                                                                                                        (2) 
 
Where yit is the time-variant dependent variable, Xit is a vector of time-variant variables, ui is the 
unit (state) fixed effect, and eit is the normally distributed error component. This unit (within) 
fixed-effects estimator effectively de-means the data, removing the unit effects ui and giving us 
the  group-average  of  the  unexplained  component  in  the  dependent  variable  ˆ ˆi i i FE u y X β = − , 
which is also the fixed-effects vector. Now, we can analyze the effects of time-invariant and 
rarely changing variables in Zi on the unexplained portion of traffic fatalities  ˆi u by estimating 
equation (3) via pooled OLS: 
 
ˆi i i u Z ω γ η = + + .                                                                                                                           (3) 
 
Where ω is the intercept and ηi is the error term. The OLS estimates of γ from equation (3) are 
included in the third column in Table 3, allowing us to infer about the impact of time-invariant 
and rarely changing variables on the portion of the traffic fatality rate that is not explained by the 
time-variant variables. 
 
3. The Estimates 
 
The results from three different estimators are shown in Table 3. The first (FE) regression shows 
the  impact  of  time-variant  variables  on  the  traffic  fatality  rate,  excluding  completely  time-
invariant  variables  such  as  mountainous  and  coastal  state  dummies  because  of  their  perfect 
multicollinearity  with  the  state  fixed  effects.  Most  of  the variables  in  the  FE  regression are 
statistically significant (at the 5% level) with the exception of young and old population shares, 
air temperature, compulsory insurance and no-fault liability laws. However, the FE estimates for 
the rarely-changing variables such as precipitation, compulsory insurance and no-fault liability 
laws have counterintuitive negative signs. Cummins et al. (2001) and Cohen and Dehejia (2004) 
find compulsory insurance and no-fault liability laws to be associated with moral hazard and 
higher traffic fatalities. Perhaps, the insignificant and negative coefficients for the two insurance 
variables reflect their low time-variance and possible endogeneity bias.   3
 
The second (RE) regression estimates in Table 3 should be less consistent than the FE estimates 
as suggested by our Hausman test. Nevertheless, the RE regression allows for the inclusion of 
completely  time-invariant  variables  such  as  mountainous  and  coastal  state  dummies,  and  is 
therefore useful. In contrast to the FE estimates, the RE regression indicates that the share of old 
in state populations, temperature, coastal and mountainous state dummies, as well as compulsory 
insurance  and  no-fault  liability  laws  have  significant  effects  on  traffic  fatalities.  Also, 
precipitation switches from having a negative and significant coefficient in the FE regression to 
having a positive and significant coefficient in the RE regression, which is more logical. 
 
The third regression in Table 3 that is based on the second stage of the FEVD procedure yields 
very  qualitatively  different  estimates  for  many  time-invariant  and  rarely  changing  variables 
compared to the FE and RE regressions. For instance, the third regression yields much larger, 
positive,  and  statistically  significant  coefficients  for  temperature  and  precipitation,  while 
producing  a  stronger  negative  coefficient  for  the  coastal  state  dummy.  Moreover,  the  third 
regression shows that speed limits, mountainous state dummy, primary seat belt, compulsory 
insurance and no fault liability laws are not statistically significant. 
 
Can anything be learned from the three regressions in Table 3? The short answer is yes. We 
recommend using the FE estimates for inference about the impact of the following time-variant 
variables on traffic fatalities: young and old population shares, population density, crime rate, 
income, alcohol consumption, and gasoline price. These variables have the expected effects on 
the traffic fatality rate and most of them are statistically significant. The top three strongest time-
variant determinants of traffic fatalities in the FE regression are alcohol consumption, population 
density,  and  crime  rate  with  corresponding  elasticity  coefficients  of  0.9,  -0.41,  and  0.25, 
respectively.  
 
As  for  the  time-invariant  and  rarely  changing  variables,  it  is  difficult  to  make  unequivocal 
inference recommendations given the ambiguous degree of time-invariance for some of these 
variables and drastically different estimates across the three regressions. However, armed with 
the knowledge of previous research, economic intuition, and RE as the benchmark estimator, we 
can make the following cautious inference suggestions.  
 
The statistically significant, positive, and rather large coefficient estimate of 0.55 for the natural 
log  of  precipitation  in  the  third  (FEVD)  regression  makes  sense.  One  would  expect  higher 
precipitation (rain, snow, sleet, etc.) to increase traffic fatalities, but the FE and RE regressions 
tell us the opposite story. Similarly, the third regression’s estimate for air temperature is positive, 
statistically significant, and has the highest elasticity coefficient (1.35) of all other variables. This 
positive relationship between traffic fatalities and temperature also makes sense given that higher 
temperature may increase fatigue and sleepiness in drivers, thereby leading to more accidents 
and traffic fatalities. Furthermore, higher air temperature may proxy for better roads and higher 
traffic  speeds,  which  would  increase  traffic  fatalities  according  to  the  Peltzman  (1975)  risk 
compensation theory. The risk compensation theory postulates that people have an optimal level 
of  risk  they  are  willing  to  tolerate  and  will  counteract  the  gains  in  safety  by  driving  more 
aggressively. For example, an increase in seat belt usage may lead to more careless driving, 
which may increase traffic accidents and fatalities. Several studies corroborate this argument 
(Garbacz, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992; Risa, 1994; Calkins and Zlatoper, 2001; and Sen, 2001).    4
 
Unlike the mountainous state dummy, the coastal state dummy has a consistently negative and 
significant coefficient across the second and third regressions. Geographic factors, like coastal 
state dummy, may proxy for cultural habits that pertain to seat belt usage, risk preference, and 
other driving habits. Several studies find that younger, less educated, and poorer males are less 
likely to wear a seat belt (Beck et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 1998; Glassbrenner, 2005). If coastal 
states tend to have better educated and older populations, then the negative association between 
traffic fatalities and coastal state dummy makes sense.  
 
The decreasing magnitude and significance of the positive coefficient for speed limits from the 
first to the third regression is somewhat puzzling. Both FE and RE regressions suggest that lower 
speed limits reduce traffic fatalities. This relationship has been supported by Friedman et al. 
(2009) and challenged by Lave (1985) and Graves et al. (1993), for example. Estimation of the 
relationship between traffic fatalities and speed limits is complicated by the fact that enforcement 
of speed limits may vary substantially across states and the potential for speed limit levels to be 
endogenous (i.e. depend on the de-facto traveling speeds and enforcement). Furthermore, the FE 
estimate for speed limits may not be accurate given that this is a rarely changing variable. The 
third regression also yields positive coefficients for compulsory insurance and no-fault liability 
laws,  similar  to  Cummins  et  al.  (2001)  and  Cohen  and  Dehejia  (2004).  However,  these 
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant. 
 
Due to the potentially endogenous and rarely changing nature of speed limits, seat belt usage, 
compulsory  and no-fault liability laws, we  cannot make unequivocal recommendations as to 
which of our three estimators are better suited for statistical inference about these variables. 





Using three different estimators (FE, RE, and FEVD), this study performs a comparative analysis 
of how time-invariant and rarely changing variables may affect the U.S. state traffic fatality rate. 
The commonly utilized unit or within fixed-effects estimator (FE) is not compatible with time-
invariant  or  rarely  changing  variables  due  to  multicollinearity  between  the  rarely  changing 
variables and the unit fixed effects. Thus, the FE estimator precludes us from estimating the 
relative impact of the time-invariant and, perhaps even, rarely changing variables on the traffic 
fatality  rate. Using  the  random  effects  (RE)  and  fixed-effects  vector  decomposition  (FEVD) 
estimators, this paper examines the effect of several time-invariant and rarely changing variables 
on the traffic fatality rate. These variables are precipitation, air temperature, mountainous and 
coastal terrain, seat belt laws, speed limits, compulsory insurance and no-fault liability laws. 
Using a longitudinal panel of 48 contiguous U.S. states from 1982 to 2006, we find that alcohol 
consumption, air temperature, and precipitation have the strongest effects on traffic fatalities. 
Our findings suggest that the policy makers and insurance industry practitioners may want to re-
evaluate the contribution of geography and climate to traffic fatalities. 
   5
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Appendix 
Table 1: Variables and Sources 
Variable Name  Variable Description  Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Traffic fatality rate  Traffic fatalities divided by state population (population/1000),  0.18 
(0.06) 
Young population  The percentage of people 18-24 years of age in state population.  0.08 
(0.07) 
Old population   The percentage of 65 and older people in a state population.  0.12 
(0.02) 
Real gas price   Per gallon gasoline price in constant dollars.   1.90 
(0.41) 
Real per capita 
income  Real GDP/total population (in thousands).  39.74 
(10.38) 
Population density   Total population/square miles of land.  0.17 
(0.24) 
Primary seat belt 
law   Dummy variable: 1 if state has a primary seatbelt law, 0 if otherwise   0.22 
(0.42) 
No-fault liability 
law   Dummy variable: 1 if state has a no-fault liability law, 0 if otherwise.  0.28 
(0.45) 
Compulsory 
insurance law  Dummy variable: 1 if state has a compulsory liability law, 0 if otherwise.  0.79 
(0.41) 
Alcohol 
consumption  Alcohol consumption in gallons per capita of total population over the age of 17.  2.39 
(0.56) 
Precipitation  Average weighted annual precipitation (rain, snow, sleet, or hail).  3.09 
(1.26) 
Temperature  Average weighted annual temperature (adjusted for time of observation bias).  52.50 
(7.61) 
Speed limit  Average (rural and urban) speed limit in miles per hour.  60.03 
(6.15) 
Crime rate  Combined violent and property crime rate.  0.05 
(0.01) 
Coastal state  Dummy variable: 1 if state with a sea coast, 0 if otherwise.  0.46 
(0.50) 




Data sources for the above variables in descending order: 
1.  The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS),  
www.fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesCrashesAndAllVictims.aspx, and US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html 
2.  Ponicki, W. R. (2004) Statewide Availability Data System II: 1933 -2003 and the US Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html 
3.  Ponicki, W. R. (2004) Statewide Availability Data System II: 1933 -2003 and the US Census Bureau Statistical 
Abstract, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html 
4.  Energy Information Association, www.tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_a_epmr_pte_cpgal_w.htm 
5.  Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/ 
6.  US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html 
7.  National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/outreach/state_laws-
belts04/safeylaws-states.htm and the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS), http://www-
fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesLaws.aspx 
8.  Cohen, A. and Dehejia, R. 2004. “The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic 
Fatalities.” Appendix Table 2: Automobile Liability Insurance Laws.   8
9.  Cohen, A. and Dehejia, R. 2004. “The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic 
Fatalities.” Appendix Table 2: Automobile Liability Insurance Laws. 
10.  Brewers Almanac. Brewers Almanac 2008. Beer Institute. Electronic Data. September 2008. 
www.beerinstitute.org 
11.  National Climatic Data Center, “Average Annual Precipitation”, 
http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/drd964x.pcpst.txt 
12.  National Climatic Data Center, “Average Annual Temperature”, 
http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/drd964x.tmpst.txt  
13.  Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “Maximum Posted Speed Limits”, 
http://www.iihs.org/laws/SpeedLimits.aspx 
14.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 3: Determinants of the U.S. State Traffic Fatality Rate 




Fixed effects vector 
( ˆ ˆi i i FE u y X β = − ) 
Estimator:  FE via OLS  RE via GLS  Pooled OLS 
Young population  0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01)  - 
Old population  -0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05)  - 
Population density  -0.41*** 
(0.13) 
-0.22*** 
(0.02)  - 
Crime rate  0.25*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.02)  - 
Real per capita income  0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02)  - 
Real gasoline price  -0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.04* 
(0.02)  - 
Alcohol consumption  0.90*** 
(0.11) 
0.80*** 
(0.05)  - 
Temperature




















Primary seat belt law (dummy)






No-fault liability law (dummy)























R-squared  0.64  0.62  0.63 
All variables are in natural logarithms except for the dummy  variables. 
†Time-invariant or rarely changing variables. 
Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
Observations:  1200  (48  contiguous  U.S.  states,  1982-2006).  The  constant  and  state  fixed  effects  are  not  reported  to 
conserve space. 